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I. INTRODUCTION
"[T]he way of progress is neither swift nor easy .... " 1 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court's near groundbreaking decision in League
of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth2 marked an-
other case where the Pennsylvania Constitution gave its citizens
vastly broader rights than that of the United States Constitution.
3
Indeed, the Court correctly decided that a perfectly gerrymandered
congressional districting map was a clear, plain, and palpable vio-
lation of the state constitution.4 However, the haste underlying the
entirety of the decision limited the impact of the case.
5
Almost every aspect of the decision was the product of impa-
tience.6 First, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court exercised extraor-
dinary jurisdiction7 over the case, refusing to wait for the United
States Supreme Court's guidance in Gill v. Whitford.8 Then, the
Court ordered the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court9 to complete
fact-finding in a mere fifty-three days.10 Lastly, in issuing its rem-
edy, the Court anticipated the legislative and executive branches'
unwillingness to redraw the state congressional districts11 and dic-
tated that, in such circumstances, the Court itself "would fashion a
1. Marie Curie, Secret Studies in Warsaw, AM. INST. PHYSICS, https://history.aip.org/ex-
hibits/curie/brief/06_quotes/quotes_03.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
2. 178 A.3d 737,740 (Pa. 2018).
3. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769, 776 (Pa. 1996) (finding rights af-
forded by the United States Constitution to be inconsistent with the constitutional protec-
tions under the Pennsylvania Constitution); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 888
(Pa. 1991) (reversing a conviction because under the Pennsylvania Constitution there is no
'good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule).
4. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 824-25.
5. See Bruce Ledewitz, A Lost Opportunity to Reach a Consensus on Gerrymandering,
JURIST (Feb. 13, 2018, 1:26 PM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2018/02/pennsylvania-
gerrymandering-bruce-ledewitz/ (noting Chief Justice Saylor's vote on the majority would
have instigated a "candid national conversation about gerrymandering").
6. Id. (explaining the Court's exigency played a role in the chief justice's decision to
dissent).
7. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 726 (2015) (noting the Pennsylvania "Supreme Court may, on
its own motion or upon petition of any party, in any matter pending before any court or mag-
isterial district judge of this Commonwealth involving an issue of immediate public im-
portance, assume plenary jurisdiction of such matter at any stage thereof and enter a final
order or otherwise cause right and justice to be done").
8. 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018) (considering a Wisconsin state legislative redistricting
plan favoring Republican voters).
9. Pennsylvania Court Structure, PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MOD. CTS., https://
www.pmeonline.org/resources/Pennsylvania-court-structure (last visited Jan. 22, 2020) (ex-
plaining the Pennsylvania Supreme Court exercises authority over "all other courts").
10. League of Women Voters ofPa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 767 (Pa. 2018).
11. Id. at 821.
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judicial remedial plan."12 Justifying its actions by use of the "immi-
nent[ly] approaching primary elections,"13 and distinguishable
precedent from 1966, where the Court gave the legislature nearly a
year to redraw the map,14 the Court ordered the legislature to do an
impossible task: redraw the congressional district map in only three
weeks.15 As the Court expected, the legislature could not meet this
deadline and the Court redrew the map itself.16
The haste of this decision sets dangerous precedent as it endorses
blatant separation of powers violations17 and manifests the state
judiciary's charge into the political thicket.18 Moreover, the case
sets ambiguous precedent as the Court provided only a "floor" of
neutral criteria that must be met for such a map to pass constitu-
tional muster.19 This "floor" provided no "ceiling" to the state legis-
lature which it could use as guidance in redrawing the map.20
This article will first lay out the background of important foun-
dational concepts. Then, it will go on to explain the majority and
dissenting opinions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision
in League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania.21 Finally, it will ex-
plain why the haste of the Court was apparent in almost every as-
pect of this case. From the grant of extraordinary jurisdiction and
accelerated fact-finding to the ultimate decision to redraw the map,
it is clear that judicial restraint in this inherently political area
would have averted most of the controversial aspects of this deci-
sion.22
12. Id.
13. Id. at 822; see also id. at 791 (noting the primary elections were scheduled for May
15, 2018).
14. Butcher v. Bloom, 216 A.2d 457, 458-59 (Pa. 1966) [Butcher Order].
15. League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 175 A.3d 282, 284 (Pa. 2018)
[League of Women Voters Order].
16. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 823.
17. Brooke Erin Moore, Comment, Opening the Door to Single Government: The 2002
Maryland Redistricting Decision Gives the Courts Too Much Power in an Historically Politi-
cal Arena, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 123, 124 (2003).
18. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 831 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (noting the
inherently political nature of redistricting).
19. Id. at 817 (majority opinion).
20. Id. (noting these neutral criteria are "not the exclusive means by which a violation of
Article I, Section 5 may be established"); see also Who Draws the Maps? Legislative and
Congressional Redistricting, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.brennan-
center.org/our-work/research-reports/who-draws-maps-legislative-and-congressional-redis-
tricting (noting this information is current as of December 20 18).
21. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 740.
22. Id. at 834 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (noting that had the "process [been] an ordinary




A. What Is Gerrymandering and Wlhy Is It Political?
The word "gerrymander" is both a noun and a verb and is derived
from the name "Elbridge Gerry," a former governor of Massachu-
setts, and the word "salamander," which describes the shape of an
election district formed during Gerry's time in office. 23 The word
carries with it a distinct political meaning: "to divide or arrange (an
area) into political units to give special advantages to one group."
24
In theory, one would expect that districts would be drawn to reflect
the distributions of populations, but in practice this process reflects
the ideals of the party in charge, thus making it an inherently po-
litical process.25 Indeed, "[b]y its definition, gerrymandering is ma-
nipulating district boundaries for political gain of one political party
or another."26 Parties use techniques such as "cracking" and "pack-
ing," which ultimately dilute an opposing party's vote by spreading
out their supporters among various districts, which they will nar-
rowly lose, or concentrating them into districts, which they will
overwhelmingly win, thereby "wasting" the opposing party's
votes.27 In fact, many scholars describe the process of redistricting
as a "bloodsport of politics," 28 or an opportunity for "political players
[to] game the system."
29
B. The Difference Between Reapportionment and Redistricting
The terms reapportionment and redistricting are often confused.
"Reapportionment is the process of deciding how many seats a state
will have in the U.S. House of Representatives when its population
23. Gerrymander, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction-
ary/gerrymander (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 831 (Saylor, J. dissenting) (finding redis-
tricting to have an inherently political character).
26. C.E. Clark, Gerrymandering and Reapportionment: An Explanation of Both and How
They Work, OWLCATION, https://owleation.com/social-sciences/Gerrymandering-and-Reap-
portionment-An-Explanation-of-Both-and-How-They-Work (last updated Aug. 21, 2019).
27. 'Cracking and Packing' Tame the Gerrymander, BALT. SUN (Oct. 3, 2017, 12:45 PM),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed- 1004-wisconsin-gerrmander-
20171003-story.html.
28. T. Alexander Aleinikoff& Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Con-
stitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 588 (1993).
29. Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J.
1808, 1833 (2012).
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changes."30 The act of reapportionment determines how many of
the 435 seats each state receives.31 After this is done, redistricting
takes place, which is the subject of this article.3 2 Redistricting in-
volves "drawing maps that divide each jurisdiction into sections
(districts) of voters."33 This is the process by which new congres-
sional and state legislative districts are drawn.
3 4
C. Congressional v. State Redistricting
There are two distinct types of redistricting: congressional and
state legislative.35 The former is the subject of this article. In
thirty-seven states, including Pennsylvania,36 congressional redis-
tricting is the duty of state legislatures.37 In four states, independ-
ent commissions create the congressional districts.38 In two states,
political commissions draw these lines, and in the remaining seven
states, congressional redistricting is unnecessary because these
states contain only one congressional district each.
39
State legislative districts are also drawn by differing actors de-
pending on the state.40 In thirty-seven states, the state legislature
draws these districts.41 In six states, independent commissions
draw the lines.42 In the remaining seven states, including Pennsyl-
vania, political commissions are in charge of creating the state leg-
islative districts.43 Political commissions vary from state to state
but are often comprised of elected officials or incumbent law mak-
ers.
44
30. PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LA., REAPPORTIONMENT & REDISTRICTING:
UNDERSTANDING THEIR IMPACT IN LOUISIANA 1-2 (2011), https://www.nfoic.org/sites/default/
files/Redistricting-Fact-Sheet.pdft
31. Clark, supra note 26.
32. See League of Women Voters ofPa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 742 (Pa. 2018).
33. PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LA., supra note 30, at 2.
34. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 741.
35. PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LA., supra note 30, at 1.











D. Federal Redistricting Criteria
When redistricting congressional or state legislative districts, the
designated redistricting party must comply with the federal consti-
tutional requirements.45 These include restraints on population
and anti-discrimination.46  For instance, the "Apportionment
Clause of Article 1, Section 2 .... requires that all districts be as
nearly equal in population as practicable."47 The Voting Rights Act
also "prohibits plans that intentionally or inadvertently discrimi-
nate on the basis of race, which could dilute the minority vote."
48
In Pennsylvania, the traditional districting criteria include "pop-
ulation equality; contiguity; compactness; absence of splits within
municipalities, unless necessary; and absence of splits within coun-
ties, unless necessary.49 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court used
these criteria as an analogy to state legislative districting require-
ments because the Pennsylvania Constitution was originally inter-
preted as not providing heightened voter protection.50 In theory,
when drawing the redistricting map, these criteria should be prior-
itized; however, in practice, the party in charge tries to give itself
a numeric advantage over their opponents" within the bounds of
these criteria.51 This is called partisan gerrymandering.
52
III. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS V. COMMONWEALTH
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was divided when it decided
that a gerrymandered congressional map, the 2011 Plan,53 which
favored the Republican Party, was a violation of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.54 The majority held that the 2011 Plan violated the





49. League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 770 (Pa. 2018); see
also PA. CONST. art. II, § 16.
50. See Erfer v. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325,332 (Pa. 2002).
51. Christopher Ingraham, This Is Actually What America Would Look Like Without Ger-
rymandering, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2016/01/13/this-is-actually-what-america-would-look-like-without-gerrymandering/.
52. Id.
53. Congressional Redistricting Act of 2011, 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. Ann. §
3596.101 (Supp. 2019), invalidated by League of Women Voters Order, 175 A.3d 282, 284
(Pa. 2018).
54. League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 825 (Pa. 2018)
(showing Justices Donohue, Dougherty, and Wecht joined the majority opinion written by
Justice Todd while Justice Baer wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion, Chief Justice
Saylor wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Mundy joined, and Justice Mundy wrote
a dissenting opinion).
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Free and Equal Elections clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution
and agreed that, in the legislative and executive branches' failure
to act, the Court should redraw the congressional map itself.55 Two
justices, including the chief justice, dissented,5 primarily noting
the rush to overturn the map in time for the "imminent approaching
primary elections."
57
A. The 2011 Plan
The subject of this case, the 2011 Plan, was enacted on December
22, 2011, following the 2010 federal census which reduced Pennsyl-
vania's seats in the House of Representatives from nineteen to
eighteen.58 This triggered the creation of new congressional dis-
tricts, which were tasked to the Republican General Assembly,
59
members of which were elected in the November 2010 general elec-
tion. 0 Pennsylvania's congressional districts are drawn by the
state legislature and are subject to gubernatorial veto.6 1 Thus, the
results of the 2010 general election placed the responsibility of
drawing the congressional district map in the hands of the Repub-
lican majority in the legislature and subject to a Republican gover-
nor's veto, that of Tom Corbett.2 The map began as a bill, originally
receiving some Democratic supportj 3 and was eventually passed by
the Senate and signed into law as Act 131 of 2011.4
B. The Claims
In response to the 2011 Plan, Petitioners filed a complaint on
June 15, 2017 in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court alleging
55. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 5; see also Ledewitz, supra note 5 (noting the majority's four
votes "were cast by... Christine Donahue, Kevin Dougherty and David Wecht-joined by
holdover Democratic Justice Debra Todd .... Max Baer[] concurred in the judgment, dissent-
ing from the timetable set out in the order and on other grounds.").
56. Ledewitz, supra note 5 (noting" [t]he Republicans on the Court, Chief Justice Thomas
Saylor and Sallie Mundy, both dissented").
57. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 822.
58. Id. at 742 (noting a census is taken every ten years, per U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, and
the census reduced the number of people in the House of Representatives, resulting in a need
for the congressional district map to be redrawn).
59. Id. at 743.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 742.
62. Id. at 743.
63. See Jonathan Lai & Holly Otterbein, Pa. Gerrymandering's Surprise Co-Conspira-
tors: Democrats, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/pol-
itics/pennsylvania-congressional-map-republican-gerrymander-democrats-vote-20 11-
20180430.html.
64. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 744.
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two counts of state constitutional violations. 5 Foreshadowing the
haste of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Petitioners brought
this challenge right before the 2018 primary elections and after six
years of being subject to the map.6 The Petitioners, the League of
Women Voters of Pennsylvania7 and eighteen registered Democrat
voters from each of the congressional districts, 8 brought two counts
against respondents: Governor Thomas W. Wolf, Lieutenant Gover-
nor Michael J. Stack, III; Secretary Robert Torres; Commissioner
Jonathan M. Marks and the General Assembly; Senate President
Pro Tempore Joseph B. Scarnati, III; and House Speaker Michael
C. Turzai, arguing that the 2011 Plan 9 infringed on their right to
vote.7
0
In count one, Petitioners argued the 2011 Plan violated their
rights under article I, sections 7 and 20 of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution, the rights to free expression and association.7 1 More specif-
ically, Petitioners alleged the General Assembly created the 2011
Plan by "'expressly and deliberately consider[ing] the political
views, voting histories, and party affiliations of Petitioners and
other Democratic voters' with the intent to burden and disfavor Pe-
titioners' and other Democratic voters' rights to free expression and
association."72 In count two, the Petitioners alleged the 2011 Plan
was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, violating equal pro-
tection under article I, sections 1, 5, and 26 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.7 3 Petitioners alleged the Plan intentionally discrimi-
nated against Petitioners and other Democratic voters by using "re-
districting to maximize Republican seats in Congress and entrench
[those] Republican members in power."
74
65. Id. at 766.
66. Id. at 791 (noting the primary elections were scheduled for May 15, 2018).
67. See About Us, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, https://www.lwv.org/about-us (last visited
Oct. 23, 2018) (noting the national group is a nonpartisan citizens' organization).
68. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 737, 741 (stating the eighteen registered
Democrats were from each state congressional district).
69. Congressional Redistricting Act of 2011, 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3596. 101 (Supp. 2019).
70. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 741-42.
71. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 765.
72. Id. (quoting Petition for Review at 105, League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d
737 (No. 159 MM 2017)).
73. Id. at 766.
74. Id. (quoting Petition for Review at 116, League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d
737 (No. 159 MM 2017)).
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C. The Rush of Discovery
This case involved congressional redistricting, and thus, federal
law dictated its base constitutional requirements.7 5 The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court found, for the first time, that the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution provides heightened requirements for congres-
sional redistricting maps.76 Before this ruling, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court rejected heightened protection, holding the Penn-
sylvania Constitution was consistent with federal law in this area.
77
With this precedent in mind, Judge Dan Pellegrini of the Pennsyl-
vania Commonwealth Court granted a stay of proceedings pending
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gill v. VWhitford,7
8
which asked the Court for federal criteria by which to judge con-
gressional districting maps.9 These criteria were particularly im-
portant as, before this time, the United States Supreme Court had
stated that partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable but
failed to agree on a clear standard for judicial review. 80
During this stay, the Petitioners filed an application for extraor-
dinary relief81 with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, asking for an
exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction over the matter.82 The Court,
in its urgency, granted this petition on November 9, 2017 and as-
sumed plenary jurisdiction over the matter while remanding it to
the commonwealth court for discovery.83 This, however, was done
without a formal overruling of Erfer, which stated the Pennsylvania
Constitution does not provide heightened protection to voters.
84
Moreover, the commonwealth court was given a mere fifty-three
days to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law to the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court.85 However, it completed this task in fifty-
75. See Erferv. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325, 331 (Pa. 2002) (stating that the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court's "new view on the justiciability of political gerrymandering claims was
predicated on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 126
(1986)").
76. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 792-93 (conducting a Commonwealth v.
Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991) analysis, which determines if the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution provides greater protections than the Federal Constitution).
77. Erfer, 794A.2d at 331.
78. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (U.S. argued Oct. 3, 2017).
79. Id. (remanding Petitioners' claims of partisan gerrymandering to gather evidence of
individualized injuries that would demonstrate burden on particular votes).
80. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127.
81. Petition for Extraordinary Relief Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, https://defini-
tions.uslegal.com/p/petition-for-extraordinary-relief/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2019) (noting a "Pe-
tition for Extraordinary Relief can be filed when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy available to a person").
82. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 766.
83. Id.
84. Erfer v. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325,332 (Pa. 2002).
85. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 766 (emphasis added).
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one days after a four-day nonjury trial.8 This haste showed in the
opinion; the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's fact-finding
lacked depth by which to judge the constitutional violation.8
7
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court hen reviewed the sparse find-
ings of the commonwealth court and began to analyze the state con-
stitution, hastily accepting the commonwealth court's conclusion
that Erfer should be abrogated.88 Thus, the Court found for the first
time that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides heightened pro-
tection to state voters.89 The Court began its analysis by noting that
the Pennsylvania Constitution "was adopted over a full decade be-
fore the United States Constitution [and] served as the founda-
tion-the template-for the federal charter."90 Additionally, the
Pennsylvania Constitution "stands as a self-contained and self-gov-
erning body of constitutional law, and acts as a wholly independent
protector of the rights of the citizens of [the] Commonwealth."91 The
Court also foreshadowed the majority's usurpation of legislative
power, stating, "the General Assembly's police power is not abso-
lute, as legislative power is subject to restrictions enumerated in
the Constitution and to limitations inherent in the form of govern-
ment chosen by the people of [the] Commonwealth."92
Turning next to the language of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
the Court found the United States Constitution does not provide
this level of protection, stating, "the United States Constitution...
does not contain, nor has it ever contained, an analogous provi-
sion."93 The Court found the words of article I, section 5 to be a
clear and unambiguous mandate "that all elections conducted in
this Commonwealth must be 'free and equal."'94 The Court inter-
preted this broadly, finding it included all aspects of the electoral
process, including "a voter's right to equal participation in the elec-
toral process for the selection of his or her representatives in gov-
ernment."95 This was bolstered by history which indicated that the
clause was incorporated into the constitution as part of a framework
86. Id. at 769 (emphasis added) (explaining that Democratic voters testified at the trial
as to their belief that the 2011 plan compromised their ability to elect a candidate who was
representative of their interests).
87. Id. at 771 (noting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not adopt the fact finding of
the commonwealth court, it merely recounted it; this indicates that the fact-finding lacked
depth).
88. Id. at 785.
89. Id. at 809.
90. Id. at 802.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 803.
93. Id. at 804.
94. Id.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
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to "secure access to the election process by all people with an inter-
est in the communities in which they lived."96
This interpretation was not groundbreaking as the Court first in-
terpreted this clause nearly 150 years ago in Patterson v. Barlow.
In Patterson, the Court held constitutional a legislative act that es-
tablished eligibility qualifications for electors to vote in all elections
held in Philadelphia.97 Building off this interpretation, the Court
found the Pennsylvania Constitution to provide broad protection to
the Commonwealth's voters, noting, "[the Pennsylvania] Constitu-
tion gives to the General Assembly the power to promulgate laws
governing elections, [but] those enactments are nonetheless subject
to the requirements of the Free and Equal Elections Clause of [the
Pennsylvania] Constitution." 98 The Court then paved the way for
its ruling, stating, "any legislative scheme which has the effect of
impermissibly diluting the potency of an individual's vote for can-
didates for elective office relative to that of other voters will violate
the guarantee of 'free and equal' elections afforded by Article I, Sec-
tion 5."99 Therefore, any congressional district map which dilutes
an individual's vote is a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion. 10
0
D. The Majority Decision: The Neutral Criteria
Based on its interpretation of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the
Court found that the 2011 Plan "clear[ly], plain[ly], and palpab[ly]
... subordinat[ed] the traditional redistricting criteria in the ser-
vice of partisan advantage, and thereby deprive[d] Petitioners of
their state constitutional right to free and equal elections."101 The
Court reached this decision by developing "neutral criteria" from
which to judge the constitutional violation, derived from the Fram-
ers' intent and knowledge of the 1873 Constitutional Convention.
102
These criteria were used both to judge the 2011 Plan's violation of
the Pennsylvania Constitution and to provide guidance to the leg-
islature for future congressional maps.10
3
Relying on tradition, the Court first explained, by analogy, that
certain neutral criteria have been utilized to judge state legislative
96. Id. at 807.
97. Patterson v. Barlow, 60 Pa. 54, 75 (1869).
98. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 809 (interpreting Patterson, 60 Pa. at 75).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 818.
102. Id. at 815.
103. Id. at 817.
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districts.104 These criteria "place the greatest emphasis on creating
representational districts that both maintain the geographical and
social cohesion of the communities."10 5 The Court then applied this
to congressional districts, finding that the authors of the Free and
Equal Elections Clause, the Framers of the 1790 Constitution, in-
cluded a contiguous and compact requirement, stating, "[the Fram-
ers] included a mandatory requirement therein for the legislature's
formation of state senatorial districts covering multiple counties,
namely that the counties must adjoin one another." 10 This was fur-
ther confirmed by the 1873 Constitutional Convention where dele-
gates explicitly adopted certain requirements for the purpose of pre-
venting vote dilution through gerrymandering.107 Relying on this,
the Court announced these neutral criteria dictate the "floor" of
Pennsylvania constitutional standards, stating:
(1) the population of such districts must be equal, to the extent
possible; (2) the district that is created must be comprised of
compact and contiguous geographical territory; and (3) the dis-
trict respects the boundaries of existing political subdivisions
contained therein, such that the district divides as few of those
subdivisions as possible.
1 08
However, the majority conceded that these neutral criteria are
"not the exclusive means by which a violation of Article I, Section 5
may be established." 10 9 This became a point of contention among
the dissenting justices as this holding seemed to omit hidden crite-
ria from which to judge a congressional map and implied that the
Court intended to redraw this map, as a remedy, all along.110
The Court explained that these neutral criteria prohibit "the use
of compactness, contiguity, and the maintenance of the integrity of
the boundaries of political subdivisions ... [to dilute] the strength
of an individual's vote in electing a congressional representative." 
111
Emphasizing the fairness of these criteria, the Court found that this
interpretation of the constitution "simply achieves the constitu-
tional goal of fair and equal elections for all our Commonwealth's
voters."11 2 Additionally, this criteria comports with the minimum
104. Id. at 814.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 815.
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing PA. CONST. of 1874, art. 2, § 16).
109. Id. at 817 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 827 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
111. Id. at 816 (majority opinion).
112. Id.
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standards guaranteed by the United States Constitution.1 1 3 Thus,
the Court adopted the "neutral criteria of compactness, contiguity,
minimization of the division of political subdivisions, and mainte-
nance of population equality among congressional districts." 11 4 The
endorsement of these criteria was a decision made by the majority
in lieu of waiting for the United States Supreme Court's guidance
in Gill v. Whitford,115 which would have dictated the federal re-
quirements. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could have supple-
mented these federal requirements with state constitutional re-
quirements. Thus, this is another indicator of the impatience un-
derlying this entire opinion.116
In applying these neutral criteria, the Court relied on the argu-
ments of Petitioners.11 7 The Court found most persuasive the x-
pert testimony of Dr. Jowei Chen,11 8 a scholar in the field of redis-
tricting and political geography. 11 9 This testimony detailed two sets
of 500 computer-simulated Pennsylvania redistricting plans, which
more closely adhered to the neutral redistricting criteria than the
2011 Plan.1 20 This was supported by Dr. Christopher Warshaw's
testimony, an expert in the field of American politics, which found
that the districts in the 2011 Plan increased the Republican "ad-
vantage to between 15 to 24% relative to statewide vote share."1 21
This, and other expert evidence,122 led the Court to conclude that
the 2011 Plan could not, "as a statistical matter, be a plan directed
at complying with traditional redistricting requirements." 1 23 Thus,
the Court concluded that the 2011 Plan undermined voters' ability
to exercise their right to vote and violated the Free and Equal Elec-
tions Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
1 24
113. Id. (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964)).
114. Id. at 817.
115. Gillv. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018).
116. Ledewitz, supra note 5 (finding that the majority's rush was a result of their decision
to apply the map to the 2018 primaries).
117. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 768, 818.
118. Id. at 768.
119. Id. at 770.
120. Id. (relying on expert testimony that compared the 2011 Plan to computer simulated
maps that utilized traditional Pennsylvania districting criteria).
121. Id. at 820.
122. Id. at 820-21 (finding the expert testimony of Dr. Chen and Dr. Kennedy to be the
most persuasive).
123. Id. at 820.




As previously stated, the Court paved the way for its remedy
throughout the entire opinion as it dictated a "floor" of constitu-
tional requirements, the neutral criteria, and conceded that these
criteria were "not the exclusive means by which a violation of Arti-
cle I, Section 5 may be established."' 125 This statement indicated to
the state legislature that there was no "right" way to redraw the
map, as part of the criteria by which it would be judged was hid-
den.126 In this vein, Justice Baer's proposed standard, a map that
demonstrates partisan advantage as the predominant factor is un-
constitutional, is clearly better as it lays out exactly what standard
should be used to judge a congressional districting map.
127
Anticipating the legislature's inability to redraw the map, the
Court issued an order on January 22, 2018 to remedy the unconsti-
tutional map.128 This order invited the legislative and executive
branches "to take action, through the enactment of a remedial con-
gressional districting plan."129 However, in that same order, the
Court prematurely indicated that, should the legislature and exec-
utive be "unwilling or unable to act," the Court would draw the map
itself.130 This action impliedly said to the legislature that they did
not have to agree to a remedial map as the Court was willing to
redraw it. 131 This also took away power and incentive from the gov-
ernor, who possesses the power of veto in such instance, because he
no longer had the encouragement o cooperate.132 While the Court
correctly claimed that legislative and executive action is the "pre-
ferred path,"133 the Court found that the "imminent approaching
primary elections for 2018" dictated the allowance "for the prospect
of a judicially-imposed remedial plan."
134
125. Id. at 817.
126. Id. at 828-29 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
127. Id. at 826 (finding "that extreme partisan gerrymandering occurs when, in the crea-
tion of a districting plan, partisan considerations predominate over all other valid districting
criteria relevant to the voting community and result in the dilution of a particular group's
vote").
128. League of Women Voters Order, 175 A.3d 282, 284 (Pa. 2018).
129. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 821.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id. (noting the "possibility that the legislature and executive would be unwilling or
unable to act" in the compressed time frame).
132. League of Women Voters Order, 175 A.3d at 284 (noting the plan has to be approved
by the Governor and submitted within twenty-five days of the order).
133. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 821.
134. Id. at 822.
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The Court cited precedent that was distinguishable, primarily
Butcher v. Bloom, 135 where it "made clear that a failure to act by the
General Assembly by a date certain would result in judicial action
'to ensure that the individual voters of this Commonwealth are af-
forded their constitutional right to cast an equally weighted
vote."'' 136 However, in that case, the judiciary gave the legislature
ample time, nearly a year, to redraw the map137 and exercised judi-
cial restraint, stating:
[t]he task of reapportionment is not only the responsibility of
the Legislature, it is also a function which can be best accom-
plished by that elected branch of government. The composition
of the Legislature, the knowledge which its members from every
part of the state bring to its deliberations, its techniques for
gathering information, and other factors inherent in the legis-
lative process, make it the most appropriate body for the draw-
ing of lines dividing the state into senatorial and representative
districts.138
Moreover, in the Butcher Order, 139 the Court did not prematurely
dictate that it would redraw the map if the legislature failed to do
so. 140
Additionally, the League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania major-
ity found support for its remedy in Baker v. Carr,141 Growe v.
Emison,142 Scott v. Germano,143 and Wise v. Lipscomb,144 stating,
"[t]he power of the judiciary of a State to require valid reapportion-
ment or to formulate a valid redistricting plan has not only been
recognized by this Court but appropriate action by the States in
such cases has been specifically encouraged." 145 However, the Court
correctly noted the "unwelcome obligation" of the judiciary into the
political thicket, stating:
135. Butcher v. Bloom, 203 A.2d 556, 568 (Pa. 1964).
136. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 822 (quoting Butcher Order, 216 A.2d
457, 458-59 (Pa. 1966)).
137. Id. at 830 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
138. Butcher Order, 216 A.2d at 467 (Musmanno, J., dissenting) (quoting Butcher, 203
A.2d at 569).
139. Id. at 458-59 (majority opinion).
140. Id. (noting the absence of this premature language in this order).
141. 369U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
142. 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993).
143. 381 U.S. 407, 409-10 (1965).
144. 437 U.S. 535, 539 (1978).
145. League of Women Voters ofPa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737,823 (Pa. 2018) (quot-
ing Growe, 507 U.S. at 33).
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[]egislative bodies should not leave their reapportionment
tasks to the federal courts; but when those with legislative re-
sponsibilities do not respond, or the imminence of a state elec-
tion makes it impractical for them to do so, it becomes the "un-
welcome obligation" of the federal court to devise and impose a
reapportionment plan pending later legislative action.
146
Finally, the Court relied on persuasive authority as support for
its ruling, noting, "virtually every other state that has considered
the issue looked, when necessary, to the state judiciary to ... for-
mulate a valid reapportionment plan."147
IV. THE COMPETING POSITIONS
A. Justice Baer's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Baer joined several of the majority's conclusions.148 He
agreed that the 2011 Plan violated the Pennsylvania Constitution
and concurred in the majority's explanation of the Free and Equal
Elections Clause.149 However, the justice dissented from the major-
ity's decision to "impose court-designated districting criteria on the
Legislature." 150 Further, he disagreed with the majority's remedy
to redraw the redistricting map in the legislature's failure to do
so.
15 1
For Justice Baer, the court-imposed "neutral criteria"152 was in-
correct and, when applied, violated Article I, Section 4153 of the
United States Constitution.154 Instead, the justice stated he would
have held "that extreme partisan gerrymandering occurs when, in
the creation of a districting plan, partisan considerations predomi-
nate over all other valid districting criteria relevant to the voting
community and result in the dilution of a particular group's vote." 1
55
Further, he claimed these neutral criteria, when applied, violated
146. Id. (quoting Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977); Wise, 437 U.S. at 540).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 825 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 826.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 817 (majority opinion).
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
154. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 826 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting)
(noting the neutral criteria is in conflict with Article I, Section 4 of the United States Consti-
tution, which concerns the time, matter, and places of elections and does not address the size
of" shape of districts; thus, the Pennsylvania Constitution criteria created by the majority is
in conflict with the United States Constitution as it instructs the legislature as to the "man-
ner of holding elections" (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1)).
155. Id. (emphasis added).
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Article I, Section 4, explaining, "courts lack the authority to pre-
scribe the 'times, places, and manner of holding' congressional elec-
tions. 151 The justice also stated that the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion "does not address the size or shape of districts,"157 and, there-
fore, the "criteria for the drawing of congressional districts [is not
appropriate] when the framers chose not to include such provisions
despite unquestionably being aware of both the General Assembly's
responsibility for congressional redistricting and the dangers of ger-
rymandering."158 However, the justice did agree with the majority's
position that the Free and Equal Elections Clause protects against
the dilution of votes and was therefore violated by the 2011 Plan.159
As to the remedy, Justice Baer noted that redrawing the map was
unnecessary, stating:
I continue to suggest respectfully that the Court reconsider its
decision given the substantial uncertainty, if not outright
chaos, currently unfolding in this Commonwealth regarding
the impending elections, in addition to the likely further delays
that will result from the continuing litigation before this Court
and, potentially, the United States Supreme Court, as well as
from the map-drawing process and the litigation that process
will inevitably engender. 10
The justice further noted that the legislature does not have a fair
opportunity to act as, in this case, it had only twenty-five days to
develop a new plan and respond to the majority's argument.1 1 He
noted that the 2011 Plan itself took a long time to develop, stating,
"[w]hile it is true that the Legislature technically enacted the 2011
Plan in two weeks, it is naive to think that the legislators created
the map in that short period of time, as opposed to developing and
negotiating details of the map over prior months."1 2 In fact, the
majority observed correctly that the development of the map took
at least eight months as hearings for it began in May of 2011.163
156. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 827.
157. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 827 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1).
158. Id.
159. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 827 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
160. Id. at 829.
161. Ledewitz, supra note 5 (emphasis added) (noting that the holding was announced on
January 22, 2018 which "directed that if the General Assembly and the Governor could not
agree on a new plan by February 15, 2018, the Court would itself draft a congressional redis-
tricting plan").
162. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 829 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
163. Id. (citing id. at 743 (majority opinion)).
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Further, the justice observed that the majority overstepped by
preparing for the "'possible eventuality' that the Legislature cannot
act in this compressed time frame."1 4 He bolstered this claim by
explaining that judicial restraint needed to be exercised in this case
as it was not necessary for the Court to formulate a redistricting
plan.1 5 Further, he noted the time frame given to the legislature
was inadequate, stating, "judicial restraint [was needed] to allow
[the] legislature a reasonable period of time, which should be meas-
ured in months rather than weeks."16 The justice also pointed out
that the majority's reliance on Butcher v. Bloom16 7 was unfounded
as in that case the Court gave the legislature nearly a year to re-
draw the map, whereas here the legislature was given only twenty-
five days.16 8 This, he stated, may result in "[s]erious disruption of
orderly state election processes and basic governmental func-
tions"169 and there was potential that even political candidates
would be harmed by this rush.
170
Justice Baer also raised concerns about due process, finding that
the Court's procedure for drawing the map would allow parties to
submit a map without the "ability to respond to alternative plans,
potentially by submitting additional evidence or cross-examining
witnesses."1 71 He noted that this remedy did not contain any provi-
sion that would allow the parties to respond to the Court's map,
which did not allow for advising of "potential oversights or infirmi-
ties in the map itself."1 72 Thus, Justice Baer found that the Court's
rush to redraw the map raised constitutional concerns.
1 73
B. Chief Justice Saylor's Dissent
Chief Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Mundy,174 dissented from
the majority's decision, specifically noting the decision was the
product of haste.1 75 In this dissent, most notably, Chief Justice Say-
lor explained he would have joined the majority opinion if it had not
been the product of rashness, stating:
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. Butcher Order, 216 A.2d 457, 459 (Pa. 1966).
168. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 830 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
169. Id. at 831 (quoting Butcher v. Bloom, 203 A.2d 556, 568 (Pa. 1964)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 830.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 834 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
175. Id. (noting the Court's acceptance of Petitioners' "entreaty to proceed with extreme
exigency').
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[w]ere the present process an ordinary deliberative one, I
would proceed to sift through the array of potential standards
to determine if there was one which I could conclude would be
judicially manageable.
173
Thus, the chief justice found the majority's haste to be the main
source of contention in this near groundbreaking decision.177 Addi-
tionally, Chief Justice Saylor found the court-imposed neutral cri-
teria "overprotective" 178 and noted the task of redistricting should
have been left to the legislature.1
79
As to the neutral criteria, the chief justice found these were an
overstep, stating, "[it] amount[ed] to a non-textual, judicial imposi-
tion of a prophylactic rule."180 Explaining that prophylactic rules
may be "legitimate in certain contexts,"1 81 the chief justice found
this to not be such a situation, stating, "[t]he consideration of
whether this sort of rule should be imposed by the judiciary upon a
process committed by the federal Constitution to another branch of
government seems to me to require particular caution and re-
straint."18 2 Further, the justice noted, these criteria were "overpro-
tective, in that [they] guardH not only against intentional discrimi-
nation, but also against legislative prioritization of any factor or
factors other than those delineated in Article II, Section 16, includ-
ing legitimate ones."1
83
Further, the chief justice pointed out that the task of redistricting
should traditionally be left to the legislature, noting, "the appropri-
ate litmus for judicial review of redistricting should take into ac-
count the inherently political character of the work of the General
Assembly, to which the task of redistricting has been assigned by
the United States Constitution." 1 84 The justice found this judicial
overstep was a result of the majority who "fail[ed] to sufficiently
account for the fundamental character of redistricting, its allocation
under the United States Constitution to the political branch, and
the many drawbacks of constitutionalizing a non-textual judicial
176. Id.
177. Id. (noting he would have agreedwith the majorityifthe legislature "ha[d] been ad-
equately apprised of what [was] being required of it and afforded sufficient time to comply').
178. Id. at 832.
179. Id. at 834.
180. Id. at 832.
181. Id. at 833; see also Thomas G. Saylor, Prophylaxis in Modern State Constitutionalism:
New Judicial Federalism and the Acknowledged, Prophylactic Rule, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 283, 284 (2003).
182. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 833 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 832.
184. Id. at 831.
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rule."185 In this same vein, the majority's reliance on Erfer v. Com-
monwealth186 incorrectly led the Court to "focus on a limited range
of traditional districting factors [which allocated] too much discre-
tion to the judiciary to discern violations in the absence of proof of
intentional discrimination." 187 This point acknowledged that the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court did not have enough time to
entirely conduct fact finding regarding the issue of intent.188 Thus,
the issue of intentional discrimination could not be fully evaluated
as a result of the Court's haste.
189
Chief Justice Saylor claimed the majority's haste was the main
error in the decision, stating, "the acceptance of Petitioners' en-
treaty to proceed with extreme exigency present[ed] too great of an
impingement on the deliberative process to allow for a considered
judgement on my part in this complex and politically-charged area
of the law."190 However, the justice found that judicial intervention
may sometimes be justified "where a constitutional violation is es-
tablished based on the application of clear standards pertaining to
intentional discrimination and dilution of voting power." 191 He dis-
sented from the majority because he found that situation "is simply
not what has happened here." 
192
C. Justice Mundy's Dissenting Opinion
In addition to joining the concerns of Chief Justice Saylor, Justice
Mundy wrote her own dissenting opinion.193 Justice Mundy disa-
greed with the majority's abrogation of Erfer v. Commonwealth94
and found the majority's adoption of the neutral criteria under-
mined its holding.195 If the Court had followed Erfer, the state con-
185. Id. at 834.
186. 794 A.2d 325,332 (Pa. 2002).
187. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 834 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
188. Id. at 767, 773 (majority opinion) (noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or-
dered the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court to fact-find on an expedited basis and its find-
ings included that partisan intent predominated the district lines; however, this finding was
recounted, not adopted, by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court).
189. Id. at 767.
190. Id. at 834 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 834 (Mundy, J., dissenting).
194. 794 A.2d 325 (Pa. 2002).
195. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 835 (Mundy, J., dissenting) (noting it is
possible to comply with the majority's neutral criteria and yet still dilute an individual's
vote).
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stitution would have been interpreted as providing the same pro-
tection to voters as the federal constitution, not more.196 Further,
Justice Mundy disagreed with the majority's remedy, joining the
concerns of Chief Justice Saylor and the dissent of Justice Baer.
197
Justice Mundy particularly disagreed with the majority's decision
to strike down the 2011 Plan on the eve of the 2018 midterm elec-
tion, because it overlooked precedent.98 The justice also found the
remedy to be unsupported.99 Indeed, the justice found that the
Butcher decision allowed the General Assembly eleven months to
redraw the map, which is distinguishable from the twenty-five days
given in this case.200 Additionally, the justice agreed with Justice
Baer's conclusion that the majority's remedy was inconsistent when
applied to federal law.
201
First, as to Erfer, the justice opined that "stare decisis principles
require us to give Erfer full effect."20 2 Erfer held that the Free and
Equal Elections Clause did not provide any heightened protections
to Pennsylvania voters.20 3 Second, the justice noted that the neu-
tral criteria, proposed by the Court, undermined the majority's con-
clusion that the 2011 Plan violates the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion.204 This is because, as the majority conceded, "it is possible for
the General Assembly to draw a map that fully complies with the
Majority's 'neutral criteria' but still 'operate [s] to unfairly dilute the
power of a particular group's vote for a congressional representa-
tive."'20 5 Moreover, the majority noted these criteria were not the
entire basis by which to judge a congressional district map.20° Third,
the justice disagreed with the remedy imposed by the majority.20
7
While she agreed that the Court had the authority to impose that
the legislature redraw the map, she disagreed with the majority's
haste to redraw the map before the upcoming elections.208 Noting
that precedent dictated waiting to redraw the map, Justice Mundy
joined in the concerns of Chief Justice Saylor and Justice Baer.209
196. Erfer, 794 A.2d at 332.
197. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 835 (Mundy, J., dissenting).
198. Id. (citing Butcher v. Bloom, 203 A.2d 556, 568 (Pa. 1964)).
199. Id. at 835-36.
200. Id. at 836.
201. Id.
202. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 835 (Mundy, J., dissenting).
203. Erfer, 794 A.2d at 332.
204. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 835 (Mundy, J., dissenting).
205. Id. (emphasis added) (citing id. at 817 (majority opinion)).
206. Id. at 817 (majority opinion).
207. Id. at 835 (Mundy, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 835-36.
209. Id. at 835.
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Last, the justice agreed with Justice Baer in noting that the ma-
jority's remedy was inconsistent with the Elections Clause of the
Federal Constitution, noting, "redistricting is a legislative function,
to be performed in accordance with the State's prescriptions for law-
making."210  Further, the justice found that none of the United
States Supreme Court cases cited by the majority supported this
remedy.211 In Scott v. Germano21 2 and Growe v. Emison21 3 the Elec-
tions Clause was not even contemplated.21 4 Further, the justice
stated the majority's reliance on Wise v. Lipscomb215 was misplaced
because that case involved Texas local districting which is outside
the purview of the Elections Clause.2
16
V. WHO IS RIGHT? THE MAJORITY'S PREMATURITY GOVERNED
BY HASTE
As almost every aspect of the majority's opinion reflects, this de-
cision was the result of haste.21 7 This was especially clear, as the
dissenting justices correctly noted, in the procedural ruling of the
majority.218 This was marked by the Court's premature order dic-
tating that, in the legislature's failure to act, the Court would re-
draw the map itself.219 This instruction was a blatant separation of
powers violation as it took away power and incentive from the gov-
ernor and the legislature.220 By reviewing the separation of powers,
as defined by the Pennsylvania Constitution, the political nature of
redistricting, and specific aspects of the majority's opinion, it is
clear that judicial restraint in this inherently political area would
have averted most of the controversial aspects of this decision.
221
210. Id. at 837 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135
S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2015)).
211. Id. at 837-38.
212. 381 U.S. 407 (1965).
213. 507 U.S. 25 (1993).
214. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 837 (Mundy, J., dissenting).
215. 437 U.S. 535 (1978).
216. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 838 (Mundy, J., dissenting).
217. See Ledewitz, supra note 5 (finding the rush by the majority was apparent early in
the litigation).
218. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 830 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting);
id. at 834 (Saylor, J., dissenting); id. at 835 (Mundy, J., dissenting).
219. See id. at 830 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
220. League of Women Voters Order, 175 A.3d 282, 284 (Pa. 2018) (noting the plan has to
be approved by the Governor and submitted within twenty-five days of the order).
221. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 834 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (noting had
the "process [been] an ordinary deliberative one," he would have been more inclined to agree
with the majority opinion).
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A. Separation of Powers
The separation of powers in Pennsylvania dictate that judicial
power is broad, stating:
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a
unified judicial system consisting of the Supreme Court, the
Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court, courts of com-
mon pleas, community courts, municipal courts in the City of
Philadelphia, such other courts as may be provided by law and
justices of the peace.
222
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has often confronted issues in-
volving the separation of powers and has articulated the particular
powers of each branch, noting, "under the separation of powers doc-
trine, the legislature's function [is] to enact laws; the judiciary's role
[is] to interpret the laws; and the executive [is] entrusted to execute
the laws."223 Using this framework, the Court itself has admitted
that redrawing a district map "is intended to be a legislative
power."
224
B. The Inherently Political Process
It is a long-standing principle that "state and federal courts con-
sistently recognize that redistricting is an inherently political pro-
cess and therefore allow state legislative bodies significant latitude
in rendering political decisions with respect to the redrawing of dis-
trict lines."225 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized this
principle in Costello v. Rice, stating, "the courts are not authorized
to reapportion legislative districts." 22 Further, in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's own words, "the role of the Court in reviewing a
reapportionment plan is not to substitute a more 'preferable' plan
for that of the Commission, but only to assure that constitutional
requirements have been met."227 Additionally, the Pennsylvania
State Constitution emphasizes that these districts are to be drawn
222. PA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
223. John M. Mulcahey, Comment, Separation of Powers in Pennsylvania: The Judiciary's
Prevention of Legislative Encroachment, 32 DuQ. L. REV. 539, 540-41 (1994).
224. Kristina Betts, Note, Redistricting: Who Should Draw the Lines? The Arizona Inde-
pendent Redistricting Commission as a Model for Change, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 171, 176 (2006).
225. Jonathan Snare, The Scope of the Powers and Responsibilities of the Texas Legisla-
ture in Redistricting and the Exploration ofAlternatives to the Legislative Role: A Basic Pri-
mer, 6 TEx. HISP. J.L. & POLY. 83, 86 (2001).
226. Costello v. Rice, 153 A.2d 888, 891 (Pa. 1959).
227. In re Reapportionment Plan for Pa. Gen. Assembly, 442 A.2d 661, 667 (Pa. 1981).
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by the legislature by placing the criteria for districts in article II,
section 16 entitled "Legislative Districts.'"228
The judiciary lacks certain political powers delegated to state leg-
islatures.229 It is essential to democracy that elected officials con-
duct these representative processes.230 As the United States Su-
preme Court emphasized, redistricting is "committed to the politi-
cal branch and is inherently political."23 1 Relying on United States
Supreme Court precedent, Chief Justice Saylor noted in his dissent-
ing opinion that "redistricting, and concomitant separation-of-pow-
ers concerns, warrant special caution on the part of the judiciary in
considering regulation and intervention." 232 The chief justice then
cited Colorado General Assembly v. Salazar233 and Vieth v. Ju-
belirer,234 noting that court intervention into the drawing of state
lines would "commit federal and state courts to unprecedented in-
tervention in the American political process."
235
C. Judicial Restraint
While it was not inherently incorrect for the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court to redraw the congressional districting map, the
Court's haste in doing so limited the holding of the case.236 Indeed,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review of the state's legislative
districting scheme was a valid exercise of judicial review. 237 This is
something that should be done as the judiciary should be the check
on the other branches of government.238 However, the Court's
premature order dictating that it would be the final creator of the
map was an overstep, as the state constitution manifestly commit-
ted this to another branch and the precedent relied upon did not
support this confined timeline.
239
228. PA. CONST. art. II, § 16 (emphasis added).
229. Sara N. Nordstrand, Note, The "Unwelcome Obligation": Why Neither State nor Fed-
eral Courts Should Draw District Lines, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1997, 2011 (2018).
230. Id.
231. League ofWomen Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 831 (Pa. 2018) (Say-
lor, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 833.
233. Id. (citing Colo. Gen. Assemblyv. Salazar, 541 U.S. 1093, 1095 (2004)).
234. Id. (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004) (plurality)).
235. Id. (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
236. See Ledewitz, supra note 5.
237. See Nat Stern, Don't Answer That: Revisiting the Political Question Doctrine in State
Courts, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 153, 154 (2018) (noting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
"briskly dismissed" the concern of whether partisan-gerrymandering claims are justiciable).
238. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 796 (finding that the Court provides a
"check on extreme partisan gerrymandering").
239. Stern, supra note 242, at 166.
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D. The Majority's Lack of Judicial Restraint
1. The Neutral Criteria
The majority's neutral criteria240 states that each legislative dis-
trict should be as compact as possible, however, the standard that
the criteria impose would not necessarily be satisfied by compact-
ness as the majority conceded this was not the exclusive means by
which to judge a constitutional violation.241 The Court stated the
"neutral criteria of compactness, contiguity, minimization of the di-
vision of political subdivisions ... provide a 'floor' of protection for
an individual against the dilution of his or her vote in the creation
of such districts."242 These criteria would not necessarily be satis-
fied by a compact district: for example, a district that is compact
and contiguous with minimization of division between the political
subdivisions would still not necessarily pass constitutional mus-
ter.243 This indicates that the neutral criteria are necessary but not
sufficient to protect the right to vote in Pennsylvania.
244
Thus, it seems that the majority intended to adopt Justice Baer's
proposed standards, which are consistent with the Pennsylvania
Constitution.245 Baer's standards require more fact-finding than
was allowed in this case, as the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
was given a mere fifty-three days to fact-find.24 Justice Baer's cri-
teria would be violated when "partisan considerations predominate
over all other valid districting criteria relevant to the voting com-
munity and result in the dilution of a particular group's vote."247 He
noted that these criteria are consistent with the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution, which does not address the size or shapes of districts.
248
Thus, these criteria would still allow for the protection of the Free
240. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 815 (citing PA. CONST. of 1874, art. 2, §
16).
241. Id. (stating "(1) the population of such districts must be equal, to the extent possible;
(2) the district that is created must be comprised of compact and contiguous geographical
territory; and (3) the district respects the boundaries of existing political subdivisions con-
tained therein, such that the district divides as few of those subdivisions as possible").
242. Id. at 817.
243. Id. (noting these neutral criteria are "not the exclusive means by which a violation of
Article I, Section 5 may be established").
244. See generally PA. CONST. art. II, § 16 (noting districts "shall be composed of compact
and contiguous territory as nearly equal in population as practicable").
245. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 826 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
246. Id. at 767 (majority opinion).
247. Id. at 826 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
248. Id. at 828-29.
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and Equal Elections Clause,249 which protects against the dilution
of votes.25
0
2. Abrogation of Erfer
The Court's abrogation of Erfer251 was another indication of its
haste.252 The majority recounted the conclusions of law and fact
submitted by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court and among
these was the abrogation of Erfer.253 The commonwealth court, in
its hurry to submit conclusions to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
found that the tests from Davis v. Bandemer254 and Erfer v. Com-
monwealth255 were abrogated by Vieth v. Jubelirer25 as a matter of
federal law.257 While this was a finding of the lower court, the ulti-
mate blame for this brisk abrogation rests on the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, which ordered the commonwealth court to fact-find
on an "expedited basis."258 This abrogation was done without any
hearing, consideration, or oral argument; it was merely a result of
these conclusory findings submitted by the rushed commonwealth
court.
259
3. The Legislature's Impossible Task
The majority's order, a premature indication of their eventual de-
cision to redraw the map, was also a result of haste.2 0 The Court
gave the majority a mere twenty-five days to complete the impossi-
ble task of redrawing a legislative district map.26 1 Moreover, in the
same order, the Court antagonistically indicated it intended to re-
draw the map itself.2 2 This not only represented a blatant usurpa-
tion of the separation of powers principle, but also took away power
and incentive from the governor and political parties who realized
249. PA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
250. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 827 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
251. Erferv. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325 (Pa. 2002).
252. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 813 (noting the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court accepted this finding without oral argument or any other formal process).
253. Id. at 785 (stating that the Free and Equal Elections Clause did not provide any
heightened protections to Pennsylvania voters).
254. 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986).
255. 794 A.2d at 332.
256. 541 U.S. 267, 290-91 (2004).
257. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 785.
258. Id. at 767.
259. See id.
260. League of Women Voters Order, 175 A.3d 282, 284 (Pa. 2018) (noting the Court an-
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they did not have to agree on a map because the Court already had
decided to redraw it.263
VI. CONCLUSION
This fragmented decision had the power to set powerful prece-
dent in an area of contention: partisan gerrymandering.2 4 How-
ever, the Court failed to do so because of its collective haste.26 5 This
impatience limited the holding of this case and represented the
Pennsylvania judiciary's charge into the political thicket.26 While
the decision was ultimately correct, it is clear that judicial restraint
is needed in this inherently political area of the law.26 7 Moreover,
the Court would have benefitted from judicial restraint, as it would
have strengthened the majority opinion and averted the decision's
controversial nature.268
263. Id. (finding that if the legislature and executive were unable or unwilling to act, the
Court would redraw the map itself).
264. See Ledewitz, supra note 5 (noting Chief Justice Saylor's vote on the majority would
have instigated a "candid national conversation about gerrymandering").
265. Id.
266. Moore, supra note 17, at 124.
267. See League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 834 (Pa. 2018)
(Saylor, J., dissenting) (noting had the "process [been] an ordinary deliberative one" he would
have been more inclined to agree with the majority opinion).
268. Id.
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